Introduction of William Twining by Tillers, Peter
TILLERS_FINAL 5/30/2008 1:06:53 PM 
 
871 
 
Introduction of William Twining 
Peter Tillers∗
Twenty-two years ago, Richard Lempert wrote that evidence 
scholarship was “moribund” when he began teaching, which hap-
pened in 1968.1  Having administered that slap at the evidence pro-
fessoriate of his day, Lempert added a passage that is redolent of 
Goethe’s Faust’s complaint about dessicated and life-sapping scholar-
ship.2  Lempert wrote that although the federal codification move-
ment had begun to breathe new life into the field of Evidence, law 
review articles about evidence generally followed “the model ‘What’s 
Wrong with the Twenty-Ninth Exception to the Hearsay Rule and 
How the Addition of Three Words Can Correct the Problem.’”3  
These articles, Lempert said, “were seldom interesting and if they had 
potential utility it was rarely realized, for the federal rules remain to-
day largely as they were when enacted.  The work was, in short, a 
 ∗ Professor of Law, Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva University. 
 1 Richard Lempert, The New Evidence Scholarship: Analyzing the Process of Proof, 66 
B.U. L. REV. 439, 439 (1986).  All revolutions, however, are apparently temporary.  If 
one is to judge by the content of some recent casebooks, there are distressing signs 
that evidence scholarship may be reverting to the desultory condition it was in the 
1960s and early 1970s.  But I refuse to identify any examples of such retrograde case-
books! 
 2 JOHANN WOLFGANG VON GOETHE, Prologue to FAUST: DER TRAGÖDIE, ERSTER TEIL 
(1808): 
Habe nun, ach! Philosophie, 
Juristerei und Medizin, 
Und leider auch Theologie 
Durchaus studiert, mit heißem Bemühn. 
Da steh ich nun, ich armer Tor! 
Und bin so klug als wie zuvor; 
Heiße Magister, heiße Doktor gar 
Und ziehe schon an die zehen Jahr 
Herauf, herab und quer und krumm 
Meine Schüler an der Nase herum— 
Und sehe, daß wir nichts wissen können! 
Cf. Posting of Jim Chen, Faust’s Midlife Crisis, to Money Law, http://money-law. 
blogspot.com/2008/02/fausts-midlife-crisis.html (Feb. 24, 2008, 23:15 EST). 
 3 See Lempert, supra note 1, at 439. 
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timid kind of deconstructionism with no overarching critical theory 
to give it life.”4
Lempert’s claim that Evidence was on death’s door in 1969 or 
1970 was an exaggeration.  Judge Weinstein was doing important 
work in Evidence in the late 1960s.5  So too were professors such as 
John Kaplan6 and Vaughn Ball.7  Moreover, James H. Chadbourn’s 
painstaking preparatory work in the 1960s on the forthcoming Cali-
fornia Evidence Code was nothing to sneer at.8  Still, Lempert’s char-
acterization of evidence scholarship circa 1970 was, in the main, on 
target. 
But things that start badly sometimes turn out well. 
In the 1970s and 1980s fresh faces emerged who changed the 
face of evidence scholarship here and elsewhere in the world.  
Among the innovators were Richard Lempert himself,9 David Kaye,10 
Judge Jack Weinstein,11 and, of course, William Twining.  Twining 
 4 Id. 
 5 See, e.g., United States v. Schipani, 269 F. Supp. 43 (E.D.N.Y. 1968), aff’d, 414 
F.2d 1296 (2d Cir. 1969) (discussed in 1A WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 37.5 (Peter Tillers 
rev., 1983)). 
 6 See, e.g., John Kaplan, Decision Theory and the Factfinding Process, 20 STAN. L. REV. 
1065 (1968). 
 7 Vaughn Ball, The Moment of Truth: Probability Theory and Standards of Proof, 14 
VAND. L. REV. 807 (1961). 
 8 Jack B. Weinstein, Writings of James H. Chadbourn, 96 HARV. L. REV. 364, 366–67 
(1982). 
      There were two major lines of legislative reform of evidence law dur-
ing Chadbourn’s lifetime: the American Law Institute’s Model Code of 
Evidence, simplified by the 1953 Uniform Rules of Evidence, and the 
California Evidence Code, which built on the Uniform Rules but involved 
a more detailed codification.  California’s formulation, based on Chad-
bourn’s studies, had a great impact on those who drafted the Federal 
Rules of Evidence, which have been adopted by more than half of the 
states.  The important monographs on evidence that Chadbourn wrote 
for the California State Law Revision Commission are now little remem-
bered except by scholars in the field.  The Commission was directed by 
the state legislature to determine whether California should adopt the 
Uniform Rules of Evidence.  Chadbourn, who moved from the University 
of California to Harvard during California’s consideration of the Evi-
dence Code, “prepared comprehensive studies of the Uniform Rules of 
Evidence and the corresponding California law.”  The studies were 
broader than advertised, for they drew on the full Anglo-American ex-
perience with rules of evidence.  The resulting Code and comments were 
based in large measure on Chadbourn’s studies. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
 9 See, e.g., Richard Lempert, Modeling Relevance, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1021 (1975). 
 10 See, e.g., David Kaye, The Laws of Probability and the Law of the Land, 47 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 34 (1979). 
 11 See United States v. Schipani, 269 F. Supp. 43 (E.D.N.Y. 1968). 
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cannot be given sole credit for the broadening and the deepening of 
evidence scholarship that we have witnessed during the last three-
and-one-half decades.  But of course no single person can take sole 
credit for the flowering of evidence scholarship during the last thirty 
to thirty-five years.  Be that as it may, Twining has been an important 
player in the transformation of evidence scholarship.  Furthermore, 
Twining has made distinctive contributions to evidence scholarship, 
and his contributions have put a special imprint on this still-mutating 
field, an imprint that will be felt, I think, for decades to come. 
Before I say just a few words about just a very small sample of 
Twining’s many distinctive contributions, I want to make two general 
points about Twining’s influence. 
First, America is not the world.  Twining’s influence on the de-
velopment of evidence scholarship in the rest of the world probably 
exceeds any other individual’s.  As many of you know, Twining is now 
known for his work on globalization.12  But even in the field of evi-
dence, Twining is a scholar with a truly global reach. 
Second, Twining is Evidence’s Mao Tse-Tung.  He, more than 
anyone else, has taken steps to institutionalize the evidence revolu-
tion—he has worked to establish programs and communities in order 
to ensure that scholarship about evidence will continue to deepen, 
broaden, and evolve, if not forever, then at least for quite a while to 
come.13
Now I want to say just a few words about just three of Twining’s 
many contributions to evidence scholarship.  I must use broad brush 
strokes; I cannot go into detail.  This is an introduction rather than a 
eulogy, and I have only five minutes to speak. 
If I have his personal history right, Twining did not begin his 
teaching career in the UK.  But he was in the UK when he began his 
work on evidence and proof in earnest.14
 12 See, e.g., WILLIAM TWINING, GLOBALISATION AND LEGAL THEORY (2000). 
 13 For example, not only has Twining been working at this evidence business for 
a very long time, and not only does he have legions of former students and admiring 
ex-colleagues all over the world, he is also one of the prime movers behind the 
sprawling, interdisciplinary, and exciting research program and community at Uni-
versity College London that goes by the name Enquiry, Evidence, and Facts.  See Evi-
dence, Inference & Enquiry: Toward an Integrated Science of Evidence, http://www. 
evidencescience.org (last visited Mar. 9, 2008).  If all goes well, this program and this 
community will continue in some form at University College London. 
 14 Twining provides details about his early career in the introduction to WILLIAM 
TWINING, LAW IN CONTEXT: ENLARGING A DISCIPLINE 1, 1–14 (1997).  Twining took up 
evidence when he moved to the University of Warwick in 1972.  Id. at 14. 
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Academics tend to be somewhat isolated from the real world.  
This was certainly true of legal academics in the UK in the 1960s and 
70s, which is when Twining came of age as a law teacher: at that time 
the vast majority of UK law teachers had little or no experience in law 
practice.  (The practice of law was a different career path then.  I 
think it still is.)  Furthermore, in those days law teachers in the UK, 
even (or particularly) law teachers (dons) at Oxford and Cambridge, 
were generally an intellectually insular lot:  they generally had little 
interest in any academic field other than law. 
As I see it, Twining meant to send his unrealistic and parochial 
academic colleagues in the UK three messages.15  The three messages 
are these: 
1. Getting the facts right is very difficult. 
2. Evidence and facts are a very big part of law. 
3. Factual inference and proof drip with logic and with theory. 
Let’s consider these messages in order. 
1. The difficulty of getting the facts right. 
Attempts to get the facts right face at least two big difficulties. 
First, subjectivity and prejudice threaten the very core of the enter-
prise of fact finding.  Second, getting the facts right is an arduous and 
time-consuming enterprise—facts are not reeled in like fish in a well-
stocked pond—because: 
(a) getting the facts right requires attention to evidentiary details 
and large masses of evidence; and 
(b) drawing sound conclusions from masses of evidence requires 
the development of multiple multistage arguments. 
Twining has taught that it is important that budding lawyers and 
judges study this painstaking and time-consuming process. 
Furthermore, Twining has taught that it is possible to teach bud-
ding lawyers and judges useful things about the process of inference 
and proof; that although assessment of evidence is at least as much 
art as science—in his view, more art than science—there is reason to 
think that law teachers can teach their students something useful and 
important about the arduous and difficult activity of factual inference 
and factual proof.16
 15 Two of these messages are particularly germane in today’s America.  American 
law teachers are becoming increasingly divorced from law practice.  Two of Twining’s 
three messages amount to shots across the bow of people who are entering law teach-
ing today. 
 16 See, e.g., TERENCE ANDERSON, DAVID SCHUM & WILLIAM TWINING, ANALYSIS OF 
EVIDENCE, at xvii (2d ed., 2005) (“Building on the work of the American legal scholar 
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But Twining makes it very clear that no student should be left 
with the notion that there is somewhere a magic bullet—a rote or 
mechanical procedure that can guarantee that any dummy or slouch 
can get the facts right without doing a heckuva lot of work.  Twining 
teaches and preaches that exactly the opposite is the case:  one im-
portant moral is that sound inference generally requires good judg-
ment and a lot of work. 
He also teaches that even when lawyers, judges, and fact finders 
work conscientiously and hard, there is no guarantee of infallibility 
about facts.  This is another reason why Twining believes that it is im-
portant for law students to study evidence, inference, and proof: they 
must be made to understand the many ways in which inference and 
proof can go wrong.17
2. Evidence and facts are an important part of law. 
Lawyers do many things.  Two of the many things they do are (a) 
gather and assess legal materials—i.e., “legal research and analysis”—
and (b) gather and assess evidence.  Twining, who is something of a 
legal realist,18 had to remind UK law teachers that practicing lawyers 
do more of the latter than of the former.19
Most of you—mature Evidence teachers—do not need to be re-
minded of this.  But some of the people who are entering law teach-
ing today probably need to be reminded of this.  Perhaps the Su-
preme Court of the United States also needs to be reminded of this: 
the Court is not overflowing with people who have seen law practice 
first-hand. 
John Henry Wigmore (1863–1943), we believe that skills in analyzing and marshaling 
evidence and in constructing, criticizing and evaluating arguments about disputed 
questions of fact are intellectual skills that can and should be taught effectively and 
efficiently in law schools.”). 
 17 See, e.g., William Twining, Argument, Stories and Generalizations: A Comment, 6 L. 
PROBABILITY & RISK 169, 178 (2007) (“A central theme of my own writing in this area 
is that both stories and generalizations are ‘necessary but dangerous’ . . . .”). 
 18 Twining initially achieved international renown as a result of his book-length 
study of Karl Llewellyn. See WILLIAM TWINING, KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE REALIST 
MOVEMENT (1973). 
 19 This is a point that Twining has made repeatedly.  In one of his papers Twin-
ing constructs a parable in which the “Oldest Member” of a new law school in 
Xanadu states at the first faculty meeting,  
  It was once suggested that 90 per cent of lawyers spend 90 per cent of 
their time handling facts and that this ought to be reflected in their train-
ing.  If 81 per cent of lawyer time is spent on one thing, it follows that 81 
per cent of legal education ought to be devoted to it. 
William Twining, Taking Facts Seriously, in TWINING, supra note 14, at 89. 
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3. Twining’s third general message has to do with the 
relationship between evidence & theory. 
One of Twining’s original motivations for studying evidence was 
jurisprudential: he wanted to develop a better understanding of law 
by getting a better understanding of factual proof in law.20  The struc-
ture of factual inference and proof should be important to many 
people other than students of factual inference and proof in law. 
The nature of argument about evidence should interest students 
of the nature of argument about legal rules and principles.  For one 
thing, arguments about legal principles may spring from facts about 
the world.  For another thing—I speak for myself now—even legal 
argument and legal interpretation may be, to an important degree, 
an effort to infer how things actually stand in the world. 
The nature of factual inference in law should also interest phi-
losophers in general—because epistemology is central to philosophiz-
ing about human society and the human condition, and the workings 
of factual inference in law shed light on problems of epistemology.21
Contrary to some rumor,22 Twining believes that imperialism is a 
bad thing.23  But he does believe that Evidence theorists need to be-
come a bit more imperialistic: they need to tell or remind other legal 
theorists that theories about law cannot get along if those theories are 
bereft of arguments about the nature and structure of inference and 
proof.  You—you down-to-earth evidence theorists—must teach those 
fancy-pants legal theorists that they can’t and won’t go far unless they 
too learn to take evidence, inference, and facts very seriously in-
deed.24
 20 See, e.g., William Twining, Introduction: The Story of a Project, in WILLIAM TWINING, 
RETHINKING EVIDENCE:  EXPLORATORY ESSAYS 1 (2d ed. 2006). 
  Once upon a time a jurist in mid-career [Twining!] decided that the time 
had come to test and explore the implications and applications of some 
of his more general ideas at less abstract levels.  The starting-point was an 
interest in “broadening the study of law from within” as part of a concep-
tion of the discipline of law as an intellectual activity primarily concerned 
with the creation and dissemination of knowledge and critical under-
standing within “legal culture.”  
Id. (citations omitted). 
 21 See, e.g., William Twining, Rethinking Evidence, in TWINING, supra note 20, at 237 
(“I soon found [in the early 1970s] that Bentham was much nearer the mark when 
he wrote: ‘The field of evidence is no other than the field of knowledge.’”). 
 22 Kenneth Graham, Jr., ‘There’ll Always be an England’: The Instrumental Ideology of 
Evidence, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1204, 1204–05 (1987) (reviewing WILLIAM TWINING, 
THEORIES OF EVIDENCE:  BENTHAM AND WIGMORE (1985)).       
 23 William Twining, Hot Air in the Redwoods, 86 MICH. L. REV. 1523 (1988); see also 
Peter Tillers, Prejudice, Politics, and Proof, 86 MICH. L. REV. 768, 770 (1988). 
 24 See generally William Twining, Taking Facts Seriously, 34 J. LEGAL EDUC. 22 (1989). 
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This is one of William Twining’s most important lessons. 
I give you William Twining. 
